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ABSTRACT

MATERIALS AND METHOD

RESULTS

Our research objective was to analyze known vulnerabilities and exploits of
several commercial off the shelf (COTS) small unmanned aircraft systems
(sUAS), identify new vulnerabilities and exploits, develop risk assessments for
each sUAS, and relate our findings to the Department of Defense’s use of sUASs.
The first step of our research was a comprehensive literature review of known
exploits and vulnerabilities of sUAS. Second, we completed penetration testing on
the sUAS to identify new exploits or vulnerabilities. Utilizing risk assessment
models such as the DREAD computer-security model, our team analyzed various
tested COTS sUAS by applying the model to each sUAS. Finally, after identifying
vulnerabilities, risk assessment scores, and countermeasures, we described the
importance of the application of risk assessments to the U.S. Navy’s increasing
use of sUAS for reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence operations.

The team will use the MITRE ATT&CK matrix, among other technical jargon, to
follow a unified language when discussing the penetration testing techniques
conducted on the sUAS researched: from initial access to impact of exploitation.
The team will focus on identifying vulnerabilities within the supplied sUAS:
the Elanview Cicada K, the Holy Stone HS100 Navigator,
the Parrot AR.Drone 2.0, which is shown in Figure 2, the Parrot BeBop 2.0,
the DJI Tello which is shown in Figure 3, and the DJI Phantom 4.. The testing will
be limited to Wi-Fi enabled sUASs because of time constraints. However, within
this subgroup of sUAS, various means will be explored to manipulate
the sUAS. These include testing the controller (smartphone applications), the
communication methods (the services offered on the network), and
the sUAS itself (physical sensors).

Each sUAS had multiple vulnerabilities. Since each sUAS connected to Wi-Fi in
some way they were all vulnerable to deauthentication attacks that exploited this
connection. The Parrot AR 2.0 proved to have the most vulnerabilities that we were
able to exploit. Others, like the Holy Stone that connected with both Wi-Fi and RF,
had far fewer vulnerabilities we exploited. Due to limitations such as the
experiment’s time frame, legality, and available technology, we were not able to
perform all possible attacks on each sUAS. Table 1 shows the
overall vulnerability of each sUAS to the different attacks that we were able
to perform.

INTRODUCTION
Understanding vulnerabilities—and, potentially, exploits—will become
increasingly important for the DoD from an offensive and defensive perspective
as insurgents, terrorists, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and other malign
actors increasingly use sUAS for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
general force disruption (Craiger & Zorri, 2019). The question arises: since the
DoD has sufficient kinetic weapons to eliminate a hostile sUAS, is there a need to
physically destroy an sUAS? A comparable situation arises when a DoD force
encounters combatant computers on the battlefield, which in many cases, are
confiscated and analyzed for potential intelligence on combatant plans or previous
actions. In the same vein, sUAS can store potential intelligence data
including videos, photographs, waypoints, previous locations as demonstrated
through GPS, etc. which can be analyzed from retrieved drones in the field. The
ability to perhaps gracefully ground a combatant sUAS allows forces to
potentially analyze combat-relevant information. Ultimately, there is an
increasing need to secure these aircraft from any form of potential attack, be it
kinetic or cyber. The sUAS consists of the operating system , the
network connection, and the ground control station which consists of the
controller and the pilot in command (PIC). Figure 1 shows this system. Each
component has vulnerabilities that can be exploited.
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Table 1. Results of vulnerablilities found in each sUAS

CONCLUSION
The DoD and malign actors are increasingly making use of sUAS so
it has become more important to understand the vulnerabilities
sUAS possess have from an offensive and defensive perspective.
Since sUAS are essentially flying computers, they will always have some level
of vulnerability as all computers systems do. By understanding the vulnerabilities
and exploits the DoD can secure their own sUAS to the best of their ability and
attack the sUAS of malign actors. This platform for combat is here to stay and
will only become more popular as technology advances.

